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Evolutionary Dynamics is a field that combines Dynamical Systems with
Game Theory. Game Theory studies the costs and benefits of competing strate-
gies. This competition between strategies is called a “game” and is usually rep-
resented by a payoff matrix. The entries of the payoff matrix represent the loss
or gain received when one type of strategy plays against another. Through the
use of differential equations known as the replicator equations, we can use the
information in the payoff matrix to model the change in relative population (or
frequency) for all of the strategies. Once we have written the evolutionary equa-
tions we can study the dynamics using the methods and theorems developed in
the field of Dynamical Systems.
The Rock-Paper-Scissor model is used to describe systems where there are
three strategies and where each strategy has an advantage over one strategy,
but a disadvantage over the other strategy. The model is named after the classic
game in which Rock beats Scissors, Scissors beats Paper, and Paper beats Rock.
Using the replicator equations, we can model the changes that occur in the rela-
tive populations of the strategies. Strategies whose payoffs are relatively better
will have increasing population frequencies while those with lower payoffs will
have decreasing population frequencies.
In this work, we consider a variation of the standard RPS game where the
payoffs vary periodically in time. In particular, we consider a model with the
following payoff matrix.

R P S
R 0 −1 + A1 cosωt 1 + A2 cosωt
P 1 + A3 cosωt 0 −1 + A4 cosωt
S −1 + A5 cosωt 1 + A6 cosωt 0
 (1)
We began our investigation by considering a simple case of our model where
we set A1 = −A2 = A and A3 = A4 = A5 = A6 = 0 thus reducing the number of
parameters down to two. For these parameters we found that, generally, the so-
lutions to the associated replicator equations were quasiperiodic. For some val-
ues of A and ω, solutions that started near the interior equilibrium point would
initially move away from the equilibrium point before eventually returning. Us-
ing a linear perturbation method, we were able to determine the parameter re-
gions for which this behavior occurred. These parameter regions resemble the
tongues of instability characteristic of Mathieu’s equation. We were also able
to determine the effects of nonlinear terms by deriving and analyzing equa-
tions for the slow flow of the replicator equations. We compared those results
to numerically generated Poincare´ maps and found that they agreed for small
perturbations.
Next we considered a subset of parameters in our proposed payoff matrix
(1) where the interior equilibrium point persists. This results in the following
conditions,
A1 = A6 + A5 − A2 (2)
A3 = A6 + A5 − A4 (3)
We used subharmonic resonance to locate the regions in parameters space
where the interior equilibrium point exhibited linear resonance. We were sur-
prised to discover that for a subset of parameters these regions of linear res-
onance disappeared according to numerical approximations. We then proved
analytically that they did in fact disappear. Finally, we extended our analytical
proof so that it applied to a family of two-dimensional dynamical systems with
time-varying periodic terms.
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
Rocio E. Ruelas was born on September 17, 1986 in Jalisco, Mexico. At the age
of four, she moved with her family to California where she began kindergarten.
Although she did not know any English, Rocio enjoyed school and quickly
caught up to the rest of her classmates. In high school, Rocio excelled in mathe-
matics, but loved learning about the applications in her physics class. Thus, she
decided to pursue a physics major in college.
Rocio attended Harvey Mudd College where she received a B.S. in Physics
in 2008. During her time there, she participated in a number of events concern-
ing diversity in STEM fields and also volunteered as a tour guide. She had the
opportunity to conduct astrophysics research with Professor Ann Esin, but re-
alized through the experience that did not want to become an astrophysicist.
The following summer, she conducted research on network clusters at the Uni-
versity of Michigan - Ann Arbor with Professor Michael Bretz. She very much
enjoyed the mathematical and computational aspects of her research. Hence,
when Rocio applied to graduate schools, she chose programs in Applied Math-
ematics and Mathematical Physics.
After college, Rocio attended the Applied Mathematics program at Cornell
University and received a Cornell Sloan Fellowship for her first three years.
She immediately started working with Professor Richard Rand and managed
to publish five papers during her time there. Rocio continued to participate in
diversity events at Cornell University and volunteered as a Registration Chair
for the Cornell’s Expanding Your Horizons workshop. After her thesis defense,
Rocio plans to teach mathematics courses at Moreno Valley College.
iii
To the Center for Applied Mathematics: Thanks for the memories!
iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I have been blessed to be surrounded by a number of people who have sup-
ported me and believed in me throughout my graduate studies. I am forever
grateful to them and hope to one day repay their kindness.
First and foremost, I would like to thank my advisor Richard Rand for his
patience, guidance, and understanding. Aside from teaching me a great deal of
Nonlinear Dynamics, Professor Rand has been an incredible example of what
it means to be a great mentor, researcher, educator, and friend. It is suffice to
say that this thesis would not have been completed without him. I would also
like to thank the members of my committee, Steve Strogatz and Tim Healey, for
their encouragement and direction.
My time in Ithaca might not have been as wonderful without the efforts of
Sara Xayarath Hernandez and the Diversity Programs in Engineering. It was
inspiring as well as incredibly comforting to be surrounded by people passion-
ate about diversity issues. Thank you for all the support, not to mention the free
lunches.
I would like to thank the Alfred P. Sloan foundation and Cornell University
for their financial support in the form of graduate fellowships. I feel very for-
tunate to have had the opportunity to pursue my research without having to
worry about funding.
Finally, I would like to thank my friends and family for keeping me smiling
and grounded. I am especially grateful to my parents for their encouragement
and sacrifice throughout the years.
v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Biographical Sketch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Dedication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
1 Synopsis 1
1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Outline of thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2 Introduction into Evolutionary Games 5
2.1 Matrix Games and Nash Equilibria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2 Evolutionary Stable Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3 Replicator Equations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3 Rock-Paper-Scissor Model 11
3.1 Dynamics of Standard RPS Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.2 Applications of RPS models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4 RPS Model with Periodic Time-Varying Payoffs - A Simple Case 19
4.1 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.2 Simple Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.3 Linear Resonance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.4 Multiple Scales Perturbation Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.5 Poincare´ map . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
4.6 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
5 RPS Model with Periodic Time-Varying Payoffs - The General Case 36
5.1 Subharmonic Resonance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
5.2 Disappearing Tongue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
5.3 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
6 Disapperance of Resonace Tongues 48
6.1 A Theorem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
6.2 Application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
6.3 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
7 Conclusion 58
Bibliography 60
vi
LIST OF FIGURES
3.1 Solutions to the standard RPS model plotted in two dimensions.
The values of x3 can be found by using x3 = 1 − x1 − x2. As
expected, there is an equilibrium at x1 = x2 = x3 = 13 and it is a
center surrounded by neutral oscillations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.1 Motions of eqs. (4.5), (4.6) for A = 0.02 and ω = 1 obtained by nu-
merical integration. Here the periodic motions of figure 3.1 are
replaced by quasiperiodic motions. Note that motions starting
near the equilibrium point
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)
remain near it. . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.2 Motion of eqs. (4.5), (4.6) for A = 0.1 and ω = 1.154 for initial
conditions x1 = x2 = 0.333 obtained by numerical integration.
Note that here a motion which starts near the equilibrium
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)
travels far away from it. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.3 Bifurcation curves (4.41) showing the number of nontrivial equi-
libria in the slow flow (4.36),(4.37). See figure 4.4 for sample
phase portraits of the slow flow in each of these regions. . . . . . 28
4.4 Plot of the first integral (4.42) for various values of k. Note, that
as k decreases, the system traverses the tongue in figure 4.3 from
right to left and the number of nontrivial equilibria changes. . . . 29
4.5 Poincare´ map obtained by numerically integrating eq.(4.21) for
 = 0.1 and ω = 2/
√
3 + k2. Cf. figure 4.4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
4.6 Poincare´ map obtained by numerically integrating eq.(4.21) for
 = 1 and ω = 2/
√
3 + k2. Cf. figure 4.5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.7 Motion of eqs. (4.5), (4.6) for A = 0.1 and ω = 2√
3
− ( 1
3
√
3
+ 0.2)A =
1.1155 for initial conditions x1 = x2 = 0.3 obtained by numerical
integration. This system lies to the left of the resonance tongue
in figure 4.3. Note that here a motion which starts near the equi-
librium
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)
travels far away from it. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4.8 Motion of eqs. (4.5), (4.6) for A = 0.1 and ω = 2√
3
+ ( 1
3
√
3
+ 0.2)A =
1.1939 for initial conditions x1 = x2 = 0.3 obtained by numerical
integration. This system lies to the right of the resonance tongue
in figure 4.3. Note that here a motion which starts near the equi-
librium
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)
remains close to it. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
5.1 2:1 subharmonic resonance tongue, eq.(5.43). The RPS equilib-
rium point at x1 = x2 = 13 is linearly unstable for parameters in-
side the tongue. The presence of nonlinearities detunes the reso-
nance and prevents unbounded motions which are predicted by
the linear stability analysis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
vii
6.1 The boundaries of the resonance tongue calculated numerically.
Red is when µ = 0.5, black is when µ = 0.7, and blue is when
µ = 0.9. The boundaries of the tongue intersect multiple times
and more frequently as µ→ 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
viii
CHAPTER 1
SYNOPSIS
The field of Evolutionary Dynamics has grown tremendously since its concep-
tion in the 1940’s and continues to be an exciting area of research. While many
of the principles of evolution have long been accepted as fact in the scientific
community, there still remain a number of unanswered questions regarding the
emergence of certain behaviors or characteristics. The most famous example be-
ing the prominence of cooperation in a variety of species including humans. If
individuals or genes are said to act in their own best interest why then do they
cooperate? Evolutionary Dynamics gives us the tools to address these types of
questions by describing behaviors as strategies and assigning benefits and costs
to each strategy. Furthermore, the population frequency of those strategies can
be described through differential equations where the population frequency of
strategies rise and fall based on their relative fitness. By studying the dynamics
of these differential equations we can determine under what conditions certain
strategies become prevalent in the species. In the case of cooperation, it has been
shown that repeated interactions can lead to the success of a tit-for-tat strategy
which cooperates unless the opposing player has previously defected [2].
1.1 Motivation
In this work, we focus our attention on a specific type of Evolutionary Game
known as Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS). Like the children’s game with the same
name, the RPS game consists of three strategies where Rock has an advantage
over Scissors which has an advantage over Paper which in turn has an advan-
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tage over Rock. The version of the RPS game where all strategies have equal
benefits and costs is known as the standard RPS model. The population dy-
namics associated with this model result in cycles where the highest population
frequency alternates between Rock, Paper, and Scissors [6, 7]. In general, all
three strategies will remain in some proportion in the population. This behav-
ior makes the RPS model a useful tool in understanding how biodiversity can
exists in biological or sociological systems.
In this work, we wish to expand on a RPS model originally proposed by
Rand et al. [15] where time-varying periodic terms are added to the standard
RPS payoff matrix. These terms could potentially be used to model seasonal
variation in biological systems. While the model proposed by Rand et al. [15]
only added time-varying periodic terms to two entries in the payoff matrix, we
extended the model to include periodic terms in all the non-zero entries of the
standard RPS payoff matrix. Thus, our model has the following form:

R P S
R 0 −1 + A1 cosωt 1 + A2 cosωt
P 1 + A3 cosωt 0 −1 + A4 cosωt
S −1 + A5 cosωt 1 + A6 cosωt 0
 (1.1)
We then analyzed the expanded model by using methods from Nonlinear
Dynamics.
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1.2 Outline of thesis
We begin this work by providing an introduction to evolutionary games in
Chapter 2. A brief history of the field is given and notable terms such as Nash
equilibrium, evolutionary stable strategy, and payoff matrix are defined and ex-
plained. We further describe the use of replicator equations to model population
dynamics of systems with an underlying corresponding payoff matrix.
In Chapter 3 we formally introduce Rock-Paper-Scissor (RPS) models and
discuss the dynamics of the canonical RPS model known as the standard model.
We identify the equilibrium points and general behavior of the standard RPS
model. Applications and prominent papers relating to RPS models are also dis-
cussed.
Chapter 4 introduces the RPS model with time varying coefficients that is
the focus of this work. We consider a simple case with only two parameters
and use perturbation methods to find the regions in parameter space where the
interior equilibrium exhibits linear resonance. Next, we study the system in-
cluding nonlinear terms by using a more powerful perturbation method called
multiple scales. This results in slow flow equations which reveal bifurcation in
the structure of periodic motions in the neighborhood of linear resonance. The
results are then compared with numerically generated Poincare´ maps for the
full nonlinear system.
Chapter 5 delves further into the time varying RPS model and investigates
the dynamics of the model under the condition that the interior equilibrium
point persists. Using subharmonic resonance, we are able to determine the
boundaries in parameter space that separate the regions of instability of the inte-
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rior equilibrium from those of stability. These regions are referred to as tongues
of instability. Numerical results suggest that there exists combinations of pa-
rameters for which the tongues of instability disappear. But numerical and per-
turbation results are approximate, whereas the question of whether or not the
tongue disappears is exact. Thus, we proved a theorem to show that the tongues
actually do close up.
In Chapter 6 we generalize the disappearing tongue theorem of Chapter 5 to
apply to a class of linear, periodically forced, dynamical systems.
We conclude our findings in Chapter 7 and discuss the implications of our
results.
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CHAPTER 2
INTRODUCTION INTO EVOLUTIONARY GAMES
2.1 Matrix Games and Nash Equilibria
In 1944, John von Neumann wrote the groundbreaking text, Theory of Games
and Economic Behavior, in which the field of Game Theory was born [23]. The
book has inspired a mountain of interdisciplinary research, most of which fo-
cuses on two-player matrix games. In two-player matrix games, we imagine
that there is a set of strategies S from which a player may choose. For each
game played we assume that each player chooses a strategy without having
any knowledge of what strategy the opposing player chooses. The choices are
then revealed and the payoffs, i.e. the costs and benefits, are given. All possi-
ble outcomes to the game can be represented in a matrix where the rows of the
matrix correspond to the strategy chosen by the first player and the columns
correspond to the strategy of the second player.
Let us consider a simple example where we only have two strategies (A and B).
The most general form of the payoff matrix would look like,

A B
A a11, b11 a12, b21
B a21, b12 a22, b22
 (2.1)
where the values ai j denote the payoff that Player 1 receives when it plays the
strategy in row i and Player 2 plays the strategy in column j. Similarly, bi j is the
payoff that Player 2 receives when it plays the strategy in column i and Player 1
plays the strategy in row j. In this work, we assume that the game is symmetric,
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meaning that there are no differences between players and ai j = b ji. In this case
the payoff matrix can be simplified to the following,

A B
A a11 a12,
B a21 a22,
 (2.2)
One of the major questions that is asked when analyzing games is what strate-
gies will rational players choose. This question lead to the development of one
of the most significant notions in game theory, the Nash equilibrium. Intuitively,
strategies that are Nash equilibria are the best response to themselves. Meaning
that if each player was playing a Nash equilibria, no player can increase their
payoff by switching strategies. More formally, the Nash equilibrium is defined
as,
p · Uq ≤ q · Uq
where U is the payoff matrix, q is the Nash equilibrium, and p is any other
strategy. Thus, p · Uq is the payoff a player receives when playing strategy p
against strategy q. Then q is a Nash equilibrium when no other strategy p does
better against than it does against itself.
2.2 Evolutionary Stable Strategies
While the Nash equilibrium is a very important concept in game theory, it is not
able to explain how certain strategies have become prevalent in a population.
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This limitation was explored in a paper by Smith and Price titled “The Logic of
Animal Conflict.”[19] Smith and Price sought to understand why animals seem
to end conflicts before either animal is seriously harmed. They devised a two-
player game designed to mimic animal conflict. In a altercation, an animal may
choose to use conventional tactics (C), which are unlikely to to cause serious
injury, or dangerous tactics (D) which are likely to cause serious harm. This
game is now more famously known as the Hawk-Dove game or Cooperation-
Defection game. An example payoff matrix for this type of game would be,

C D
C 2 −2
D 3 −1
 (2.3)
From (2.3) we see that if all the animals use conventional tactics they all
benefit, but if just a few use dangerous tactics then those individuals will receive
a higher payoff. Therefore, no matter what the opponent does it is always best
to use dangerous tactics and D is a Nash equilibrium. However, in nature, we
observe that animals tend to use conventional rather than dangerous tactics.
For example, in many snake species the males fight each other by wrestling
without using their fangs [19]. How can the prevalence of conventional tactics
be explained?
Smith and Price were able to explain the rise of conventional tactics by
changing their model to include repeated interactions and mixed strategies. By
including repeated interactions, the animal’s choice can now be informed by the
previous interactions and successful strategies can be adapted by other players.
Also, animals are not limited to only choosing one strategy, but can choose C
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or D with varying probabilities. Through these changes, Smith and Price were
searching for a strategy that once adopted by a majority of players could not
be be overtaken by variants of that strategy. This is known as an Evolutionary
Stable Strategy or ESS. For understanding how strategies arise and persist in a
population, the ESS is more relevant than a Nash equilibrium.
2.3 Replicator Equations
In order to find and investigate strategies that are evolutionary stable there must
be a dynamical component to the model. The replicator equations are a natural
way to model population dynamics with an underlying payoff matrix.
Replicator dynamics assumes that a population is divided into n groups,
each utilizing different strategies ranging from S i to S n [6].The fraction or fre-
quency that a group appears in the population is denoted by x1, ..., xn. Notice
that since the xi are frequencies then
∑
xi = 1. The fitness, fi, of a strategy S i in-
fluences the rate of growth of that population and is determined by the current
state of the population x = {x1, ..., xn} and the payoff matrix. That is, if A is the
associated payoff matrix, and the entry ai j corresponds to the payoff received
by a player playing strategy S i against strategy S j then,
fi(x) =
∑
j
ai jx j = (Ax)i (2.4)
We further assume that our population is very large, interactions between
all members of the population happen instantaneously, and the evolution of
the state x(t) is continuous. Based on natural selection, we would expect that
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strategies who are more fit will have more reproductive success and become a
larger fraction of the population. Therefore, the population dynamics can be
modeled by a system of ordinary differential equations (ODEs), known as the
replicator equations, which have the following form:
x˙i = xi( fi(x) − f¯ (x)) i = 1, ..., n (2.5)
Here, f¯ (x) is the average fitness of the population frequency.
f¯ (x) =
∑
xi fi(x) (2.6)
In eq. (2.5), when a strategy has a fitness above average, the frequency of
that strategy in the population grows. On the other hand, if the fitness is below
average then the frequency of that strategy in the population declines. In this
way, elements of game theory are combined with differential equations to study
the evolution of strategies in a population.
Since we have stipulated that
∑
xi = 1, then the dynamics of the replicator
equations lie on the set of non-negative points whose sum is one. This set is
known as the simplex [13]. Essentially, the condition that the population fre-
quencies must sum to one reduces the dimension of the system of replicator
equations by one. For example, if there were two strategies, the simplex would
be a line and if there were three strategies the simplex would be a plane.
The equilibria associated with the replicator equations are connected to the
game theory concepts of Nash equilibriums and evolutionary stable strategies.
Equilibrium points that are asymptotically stable correspond to an evolutionary
stable state, meaning that the population frequencies will not rest at any other
nearby state. Also, equilibrium points in the replicator equations which are
Lyapunov stable correspond to Nash equilibria [6]. Hence, by analyzing the
9
dynamics of the replicator equations for a specific game, we are still able to
draw conclusions of a game theoretic nature.
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CHAPTER 3
ROCK-PAPER-SCISSORMODEL
In this work, we wish to consider a game where there are three strategies com-
peting against each other. Each strategy has an advantage over one other strat-
egy, but a disadvantage over the third. This game is most commonly known as
the Rock-Paper-Scissor (RPS) game. There are many games that fall under the
RPS category, but all of them have a payoff matrix that can be reduced to the
following:

R P S
R 0 −a2 b3
P b1 0 −a3
S −a1 b2 0
 (3.1)
For now, we assume that ai and bi are positive constants. The replicator equa-
tions for the matrix (3.1) have been well studied [13] and are known to have
three equilibrium points at the vertices of the simplex and one equilibrium in
the interior of the simplex. The stability of the interior equilibrium is depen-
dent on determinant of the payoff matrix. If the determinant of (3.1) is positive,
which corresponds to a1a2a3 < b1b2b3, then the interior equilibrium is globally
stable. If instead the determinant is negative and a1a2a3 > b1b2b3, then the inte-
rior equilibrium is unstable. In the case where a1a2a3 = b1b2b3 the determinant
is zero and the interior equilibrium point is a center surrounded by neutral os-
cillations [13].
We are particularly interested in the dynamics for the case where the deter-
minant of (3.1) is zero. For parameters that satisfy this condition, the replica-
tor equations are structurally unstable, meaning that small perturbations to the
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equations can lead to qualitatively different dynamics. Therefore, variations of
this RPS model are more interesting to study.
3.1 Dynamics of Standard RPS Model
To understand the dynamics of more complicated RPS models such as the time-
varying RPS model that is the focus of this work, we must first investigate the
dynamics of the simplest RPS model. This model, referred to as the standard
RPS model, has all ai equal to 1 [22]. Hence the payoff matrix is the following,

R P S
R 0 −1 1
P 1 0 −1
S −1 1 0
 (3.2)
Notice that the standard model has a payoff matrix whose determinant is zero.
Therefore we should expect that the interior equilibrium point will be a center
surrounded by neutral oscillations [13]. Using this payoff matrix (3.2) we can
derive the replicator equations which determine the population dynamics of the
system. From section 2.3, we know that the replicator equations are defined as,
x˙i = xi( fi(x) − f¯ (x)) i = 1, ..., n (3.3)
where,
fi(x) =
∑
j
ai jx j = (Ax)i (3.4)
and
f¯ (x) =
∑
xi fi(x) (3.5)
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This gives the following fitnesses,
f1 = −x2 + x3 (3.6)
f2 = x1 − x3 (3.7)
f3 = −x1 + x2 (3.8)
which in turn gives an average fitness of zero.
f¯ (x) = x1(−x2 + x3) + x2(x1 − x3) + x3(−x1 + x2) = 0 (3.9)
From eq. 3.3 we see that the replicator equations become
x˙1 = x1(−x2 + x3) (3.10)
x˙2 = x2(x1 − x3) (3.11)
x˙3 = x3(−x1 + x2) (3.12)
and we have a three-dimensional, first-order, nonlinear dynamical system.
Since x1, x2, x3 denote population frequencies, then their sum must equal 1. This
allows us to reduce the dimension of our system down to two by substituting
x3 = 1 − x1 − x2.
x˙1 = x1(1 − 2x2 − x1) (3.13)
x˙2 = x2(x2 + 2x1 − 1) (3.14)
Hence the dynamics can be represented on a two dimensional plane. To find
the equilibrium points we set eqs. 3.13-3.14 to zero and solve the system of
equations.
0 = x1(1 − 2x2 − x1) (3.15)
0 = x2(x2 + 2x1 − 1) (3.16)
Doing so gives four equilibrium points. Three points lie at the corners of the
simplex at (0, 0, 1), (0, 1, 0), and (1, 0, 0). The fourth equilibrium is located right
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at the center of the simplex at
(
1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
3
)
. A linear stability analysis shows that
the equilibrium points at the corners of the simplex are saddle points, while the
interior equilibrium point is a linear center. Furthermore, eq. 3.13 and eq. 3.14
admit a first integral.
x1x2(1 − x1 − x2) = constant (3.17)
When the integral curves are plotted in figure 3.1, we see that there is indeed
a center at
(
1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
3
)
surrounded by neutral cycles. Therefore, in the interior of
simplex and away from the center point, the population frequencies change in
time and no one strategy reaches a stable state.
Figure 3.1: Solutions to the standard RPS model plotted in two dimen-
sions. The values of x3 can be found by using x3 = 1 − x1 − x2.
As expected, there is an equilibrium at x1 = x2 = x3 = 13 and it is
a center surrounded by neutral oscillations.
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The standard model is a very special case in the family of RPS models. Any
slight perturbation leads to qualitatively different results. Therefore it is an in-
teresting case to study and a good launching point to investigate more compli-
cated RPS models. The model that is the main focus of this work and introduced
in chapter 4 simplifies to the standard model for certain choices of parameters
and can in fact be considered a perturbation on the standard model for small
values of those parameters.
3.2 Applications of RPS models
RPS models have been used in the biological and social sciences as a means to
understand biodiversity and co-evolution. They apply to systems where there
are three competing strategies or populations and the relationship between the
strategies is similar to the children’s game Rock-Paper-Scissors. Systems that
exhibit this relationship will have population frequencies that periodically os-
cillate.
One example of a biological system that exhibits a rock-paper-scissor dy-
namic is the male population of the side-blotched lizard or Uta stansburiana [18].
Males of the side-blotched lizard have three different colorings on their throats
that correspond to the reproductive strategy they utilize. The males with or-
ange throats have a higher level of testosterone and defend large territories
with a large number of females. Blue-colored males have lower testosterone
and defend smaller territories with less females. The third type is referred to
as a “sneaker” male. It has a yellow-colored throat which resembles the female
side-blotch lizard. Since it appears similar to female side-blotch lizards it is able
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to sneak into large territories undetected and mate with the females in that terri-
tory. Hence the “sneaker” male had an advantage over the orange-colored male
with the large territory, but not over the blue-colored male with the small terri-
tory since the blue-colored male can more easily defend his territory. However,
the orange-colored male has an advantage over the blue-colored male since he
has access to a larger number of females due to maintaining a larger territory.
Thus, the three reproductive strategies compete in a rock-paper-scissor fashion.
In a paper titled “The rock-paper-scissor game and the evolution of alternative
male strategies,” Sinervo and Lively were able to show that the populations of
the different male types did in fact oscillate with one strategy dominating for a
time before it was overtaken by the strategy that has an advantage over it [18].
Another example of a biological system with a rock-paper-scissor dynamic
is the interaction between three competing strains of Escherichia coli, otherwise
known as E. coli. According to Kirkup and Riley in “Antibiotic-mediated antag-
onism leads to a bacterial game of rock-paper-scissor in vivo,” there exist a strain
of E. coli that produces colicins, which are a type of antibiotic. The antibiotic-
producing strain kills another strain of E. coli that is sensitive to the antibiotic.
However a third strain exists that is resistant to the antibiotic and out competes
the antibiotic strain. When no antibiotic strain is present, the sensitive strain
out competes the resistant strain. Thus these three strains exhibit a rock-paper-
scissor dynamic. In their paper, Kirkup and Riley where able to show that all
three strains of E. coli could coexist as long as their environment were spatially
structured [8].
Rock-paper-scissor dynamics also occur in fields outside of biology. In a
paper by Semmann, Krambeck, and Milinski, the authors give an example
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of a sociological system with three strategies whose populations oscillate in
a RPS manner [17]. They conducted public goods experiments where people
could anonymously choose from three strategies for an undetermined number
of rounds. Subjects could choose the cooperation strategy which meant that
they joined a group and contributed money to a public pool that is then mul-
tiplied by a factor larger than 1 and distributed evenly amongst members of
the group. Subjects could also choose to join the group and then defect by not
contributing any money. In this way, they receive the benefit of the distributed
money without any of the cost. The third strategy referred to as the “loner”
strategy does not join the group and instead receives a fixed amount money. If
the population is composed of mostly cooperators then the defectors have an
advantage since they receive the group benefit without the cost. However, if the
population consists primarily of defectors then money distributed to the group
will be very low and loners have the advantage. Finally, in a population com-
posed of mostly loners, cooperators can potentially receive more money and
gain an advantage. Similar to the previous papers, the authors found that the
populations of cooperators, defectors, and loners oscillated so that whichever
strategy was most abundant would be overtaken by the strategy which has an
advantage over it.
Due to the number of real-life applications, there are number of papers that
study variations of the RPS model hoping to capture a certain type of behavior
or understand mechanisms for biodiversity. For example, Mauro Mobilia [11]
introduced mutation into the RPS model and found that for low mutation rates
there exists parameters for which the system produces a limit cycle as a result
of a Hopf bifurcation. In this work, we seek to investigate a model that adds
a periodic forcing term to the standard RPS model. One application could be
17
to model the effect of seasonal variation and its impact on the payoffs of the
competing strategies.
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CHAPTER 4
RPS MODEL WITH PERIODIC TIME-VARYING PAYOFFS - A SIMPLE
CASE
4.1 Model
We are interested in considering a variation of the RPS model that has entries
in the payoff matrix that are time-dependent and periodic. Our motivation is to
create a model that will account for possible seasonal variation in the interac-
tions of the strategies. Previous work done by Rand et al. [15] considers a vari-
ation of the RPS model with two periodic terms added to the standard model.
Our model expands on that work and considers the addition of periodic terms
to all nonzero entries of the payoff matrix. We therefore propose a model of the
following form:

R P S
R 0 −1 + A1 cosωt 1 + A2 cosωt
P 1 + A3 cosωt 0 −1 + A4 cosωt
S −1 + A5 cosωt 1 + A6 cosωt 0
 (4.1)
Once we eliminate x3 by applying the constraint x3 = 1 − x1 − x2, the new RSP
model leads to replicator equations of the following type,
x˙1 = x1(1 − 2x2 − x1) + x1G1(x1, x2; Ai) cosωt (4.2)
x˙2 = x2(x2 + 2x1 − 1) + x2G2(x1, x2; Ai) cosωt (4.3)
where G1 and G2 are polynomials in x1, x2, and the Ai’s.
The presence of the time-varying periodic terms, Ai cosωt, destroys the first in-
tegral found in the original RPS model. In addition, for general values of Ai, the
equilibrium at
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)
disappears.
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4.2 Simple Case
We begin our analysis of the proposed model by first studying the model put
forth by Rand et al. [15] If we set A1 = −A2 = −A and A3 = A4 = A5 = A6 = 0 then
our payoff matrix becomes:

R P S
R 0 −1 − A cosωt 1 + A cosωt
P 1 0 −1
S −1 1 0
 (4.4)
and the corresponding replicator equations are:
x˙1 = x1(1 − 2x2 − x1)[1 + (1 − x1)A cosωt] (4.5)
x˙2 = x2(x2 + 2x1 − 1 + [x1(2x2 + x1 − 1)]A cosωt) (4.6)
This is exactly the model introduced by Rand et al. [15] Numerical integration
shows that for small values of A the periodic motions of the standard RPS sys-
tem are typically replaced by quasiperiodic motions, see figure 4.1. In particular,
motions starting near the equilibrium point
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)
typically remain near it as seen
in figure 4.1. An exception occurs for certain values of the system parameters A
and ω. See figure 4.2 which displays a numerically integrated motion starting
near
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)
for parameters A = 0.1, ω = 1.154. Note that here a motion which
starts near the equilibrium
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)
travels far away from it.
In a previous work done by Rand et al. [15], resonant values of the param-
eters ω and A were identified using Floquet theory and associated instabilities
of the equations linearized about the equilibrium point were studied. Here we
seek to explain the phenomenon in figure 4.1 and figure 4.2 through the use of
perturbation methods. This will allow us to understand non only where such
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Figure 4.1: Motions of eqs. (4.5), (4.6) for A = 0.02 and ω = 1 obtained
by numerical integration. Here the periodic motions of figure
3.1 are replaced by quasiperiodic motions. Note that motions
starting near the equilibrium point
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)
remain near it.
resonances occur, but also the structure of the phase space in the neighborhood
of parametric resonances.
4.3 Linear Resonance
We begin by translating the origin to the equilibrium at
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)
and scaling the
coordinates by  << 1. We set
x1 = x +
1
3
, x2 = y +
1
3
, (4.7)
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Figure 4.2: Motion of eqs. (4.5), (4.6) for A = 0.1 and ω = 1.154 for initial
conditions x1 = x2 = 0.333 obtained by numerical integration.
Note that here a motion which starts near the equilibrium
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)
travels far away from it.
and substitute these into eqs.(4.5) and(4.6), giving:
x˙ =
(3 x + 1) ((3 x − 2 )A cosωt − 3) (2 y + x)
9
(4.8)
y˙ =
(3 y + 1)
(
(6 x y + 2 y + 3 x2 + x)A cosωt + 6 x + 3 y
)
9
(4.9)
Our first step in the analysis of these ODEs is to determine which values of
ω produce instability via parametric resonance for small values of the forcing
amplitude A. In the work by Rand et al.[15], this was accomplished by using
Floquet theory. Here we obtain this information directly from the perturbation
method as follows. We first linearize (4.8),(4.9) for small values of x and y. This
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can be done by setting  = 0, giving:
x˙ = −
(
x + 2y
3
)
− 2
9
(2y + x)A cosωt (4.10)
y˙ =
(
2x + y
3
)
+
1
9
(2y + x)A cosωt (4.11)
Now we look for a solution to these equations via regular perturbations, valid
for small A << 1. The simplest way to do this is to transform this first order
system of ODEs into a single second order ODE by differentiating (4.10) and
substituting expressions for y˙ from (4.11) and for y from (4.10), giving:
f1 x¨ + f2 x˙ + f3x = 0 (4.12)
where
f1 = 3 + 2A cosωt (4.13)
f2 = 2Aω sinωt (4.14)
f3 =
(
3 + 2A cosωt
3
)2
(4.15)
We set
x = x0 + A x1 + O(A2) (4.16)
Substituting (4.16) into (4.12) and collecting terms gives:
x¨0 +
x0
3
= 0 (4.17)
x¨1 +
x1
3
= −2
3
x¨0 cosωt − 23ωx˙0 sinωt −
4
9
x0 cosωt (4.18)
Eq.(4.17) shows that x0 will have frequency 1/
√
3, whereupon the right hand
side of eq.(4.18) will have terms with frequencies:
ω ± 1√
3
(4.19)
Resonant values of ω will correspond to forcing frequencies (4.19) which are
equal to natural frequencies of the homogeneous x1 equation, i.e. to 1/
√
3. This
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gives that
ω =
2√
3
(resonance) (4.20)
This value of ω corresponds to the largest resonance tongue. There are an infini-
tude of smaller tongues which would emerge from the perturbation method if
we were to continue it to O(A2) and higher. These have been shown to be of the
form ω = 2/(n
√
3) for n = 2, 3, ... [15].
4.4 Multiple Scales Perturbation Method
The resonance (4.20) partially explains the phenomenon displayed in figure 4.2:
when ω lies close to the resonant value of 2√
3
, motions which start near the equi-
librium point (x = 0, y = 0) (i.e. (x1 = 13 , x2 =
1
3 )) may move relatively far away
from it. This result is incomplete in that it does not explain how far a motion
will travel from the equilibrium point, how the motion depends on initial con-
ditions, or how close to the resonance value (4.20) the parameter ω must be
chosen for this phenomenon to occur. Here we obtain approximate answers to
these questions by using a more powerful perturbation approach.
We prepare for the perturbation expansion by setting τ = ωt and A = 2 in
eqs. (4.8), (4.9), and then again transforming the two first order ODEs into a
single second order nonlinear ODE, giving:
18ω2 (3  x + 1)
(
3 3 x cos τ − 2 2 cos τ − 3
)
x′′ =
81  ω2
(
6 3 x cos τ − 1
)
x′2 − 18 2 ω2 sin τ (3  x − 2) (3  x + 1) x′
− 243 9 x6 cos2 τ + 162 6 cos τ
(
2 2 cos τ + 3
)
x5
24
− 27 3
(
4 cos2 τ + 12 2 cos τ + 9
)
x4 − 18 4 cos τ
(
5 2 cos τ + 9
)
x3
+ 3 
(
2 2 cos τ + 3
) (
2 2 cos τ + 9
)
x2 + 2
(
2 2 cos τ + 3
)2
x (4.21)
Here primes represent differentiation with respect to τ. Neglecting terms of
O(3), we obtain
ω2 x′′ +
x
3
=

(
3ω2 x′2 − x2
)
2
−
2
(
ω2
(
81 x x′2 + 12 x′ sin τ
)
− 27 x3 + 4 x cos τ
)
18
+ O(3)(4.22)
Next we define three time scales ξ, η and ζ:
ξ = τ, η = τ, ζ = 2τ (4.23)
and we consider x to be a function of ξ, η and ζ, whereupon the chain rule gives:
x′ = xξ + xη + 2xζ (4.24)
x′′ = xξξ + 2xξη + 22xξζ + 2xηη (4.25)
We detune ω off of the resonance (4.20):
ω =
2√
3
+ k2 + · · · (4.26)
and expand x = x0+x1+2x2+· · ·. Substituting (4.24),(4.25) and these expansions
into (4.22) and collecting terms, we obtain:
Lx0 = 0, where L(·) = (·)ξξ + 14(·) (4.27)
Lx1 = −38 x
2
0 − 2x0ξη +
3
2
x02ξ (4.28)
Lx2 = −34 x0x1 +
9
8
x30 −
√
3kx0ξξ − 16 x0 cos ξ − 2x1ξη
−2x0ξζ − x0ηη + 3x0ξx1ξ − 92 x0x0
2
ξ −
2
3
x0ξ sin ξ + 3x0ηx0ξ (4.29)
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We take the solution of (4.27) in the form:
x0 = a0(η, ζ) cos
ξ
2
+ b0(η, ζ) sin
ξ
2
(4.30)
Substituting the expression for x0 (4.30) into the x1 equation (4.28), and removing
secular terms gives
∂a0
∂η
= 0,
∂b0
∂η
= 0 ⇒ a0 = a0(ζ), b0 = b0(ζ) (4.31)
Solving for x1, we obtain
x1 = a1(η, ζ) cos
ξ
2
+ b1(η, ζ) sin
ξ
2
+ a0 b0 sin ξ − 12b0
2 cos ξ +
1
2
a02 cos ξ (4.32)
Next we substitute the expression for x1 (4.32) into the x2 equation (4.29), and
remove secular terms, giving
∂a1
∂η
= f (a0, b0),
∂b1
∂η
= g(a0, b0) (4.33)
where
f (a0, b0) = −da0dζ +
b0
12
−
√
3
4
kb0 − 34b
3
0 −
3
4
a20b0 (4.34)
g(a0, b0) = −db0dζ +
a0
12
+
√
3
4
ka0 +
3
4
a30 +
3
4
b20a0 (4.35)
Now from eq.(4.31) we see that a0 and b0 do not depend on η and thus neither
do f (a0, b0) or g(a0, b0). Eqs.(4.33) show that a1 and b1 will grow linearly in time
η unless f (a0, b0)=0 and g(a0, b0)=0. Thus for a1 and b1 to remain bounded, we
require
da0
dζ
=
b0
12
−
√
3
4
kb0 − 34b
3
0 −
3
4
a20b0 (4.36)
db0
dζ
=
a0
12
+
√
3
4
ka0 +
3
4
a30 +
3
4
b20a0 (4.37)
This system of slow-flow equations is easier to study in polar coordinates so we
set a0 = r cos θ and b0 = r sin θ. The slow flow equations become:
∂r
∂ζ
=
1
12
r sin 2θ,
∂θ
∂ζ
=
3
4
r2 +
cos 2θ
12
+
√
3
4
k (4.38)
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In view of eq.(4.30), equilibrium points in the slow-flow (4.38) correspond to
periodic motions in the standard RPS system (4.5), (4.6). The first of (4.38) gives
θ = 0, pi/2, pi, 3pi/2, whereupon the second of (4.38) gives
3
4
r2 ± 1
12
+
√
3
4
k = 0 ⇒ r2 = ∓1
9
−
√
3
3
k (4.39)
Since r2 > 0, we get bifurcations at
k = ± 1
3
√
3
(4.40)
For k > 1
3
√
3
there are no nontrivial equilibria, while for k < − 1
3
√
3
there are four.
In the intermediate case of − 1
3
√
3
< k < 1
3
√
3
there are two nontrivial equilibria.
Since A = 2 and eq.(4.26), the bifurcation curves have the form:
ω =
2√
3
± 1
3
√
3
A + · · · (4.41)
This agrees with the work done by Rand et al. [15] concerning the location of
stability transition curves, see figure 4.3. The slow-flow (4.38) is conservative
and admits the following first integral:
9r4 + 2(3
√
3k + cos 2θ)r2 = constant (4.42)
Figure 4.4 displays the first integral (4.42) for k = 1
3
√
3
+ 0.2 = 0.3925, k = 0, and
k = − 1
3
√
3
− 0.2 = −0.3925, respectively. Here we have identified x with a0, being
approximately x0 at ξ = 0 in eq.(4.30). Similarly, x′ is identified with b0/2.
4.5 Poincare´ map
The foregoing results of the perturbation method may be compared to numeri-
cal integration of equation (4.21) by use of a Poincare´ map. Here we imagine a
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Figure 4.3: Bifurcation curves (4.41) showing the number of nontrivial
equilibria in the slow flow (4.36),(4.37). See figure 4.4 for sam-
ple phase portraits of the slow flow in each of these regions.
flow on a three-dimensional phase space with axes x,x′,t, and an associated map
produced by sampling the said flow at times τ = 2Npi, for N = 0, 1, 2, 3, · · ·. The
associated Poincare´ maps depend upon both ω and . Local behavior around
the equilibrium point at the origin x=x′=0 is naturally affected by ω as in figure
4.4. The parameter  affects both the strength of the forcing (because the forcing
amplitude A = 2) and the importance of nonlinearities (because the coordinates
have been scaled by , cf. eq.(4.7)).
As a check on the perturbation results (which are expected to be valid for
small ), we first present Poincare´ maps for  = 0.1 and for the same values
28
Figure 4.4: Plot of the first integral (4.42) for various values of k. Note,
that as k decreases, the system traverses the tongue in figure
4.3 from right to left and the number of nontrivial equilibria
changes.
29
of ω as in figure 4.4. See figure 4.5. Note that there is good agreement in the
neighborhood of the origin.
As an example of the kind of behavior which occurs for larger values of , we
present Poincare´ maps for  = 1 and for the same values of k as in figure 4.5. See
figure 4.6. These figures show the appearance of chaos which is associated with
KAM theory [1]. KAM theory, named for it’s inventors, Kolmogorov, Arnold
and Moser, describes the onset of chaos in a perturbed Hamiltonian system.
Among the various features of KAM theory is the phenomenon that chaos oc-
curs most noticeably in the neighborhood of motions which in the unperturbed
Hamiltonian system are in low order resonance with the periodic driver. This
is relevant to us here because eqs. (4.5), (4.6) may be written in the form of a
perturbed Hamiltonian system:
x˙1 =
∂H
∂x2
+
A cosωt
h
∂M
∂x2
(4.43)
x˙2 = −∂H
∂x1
− A cosωt
h
∂M
∂x1
(4.44)
where
H = x1x2(1 − x1 − x2) (4.45)
h =
−1
x1(1 − x1)2(1 − x1 − 2x2) (4.46)
M =
x2
x1 − 1 (4.47)
Thus when A=0, the system (4.5), (4.6) is integrable and the Poincare´ map con-
sists of closed curves as shown in figure 3.1. Then as predicted by KAM theory,
the closed curves in the Poincare´ map of the unperturbed Hamiltonian system
which are in n : 1 resonance with cosωt are replaced by 2 n−cycles, one stable
and one unstable. The stable n-cycle appears in simulations as n closed curves
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Figure 4.5: Poincare´ map obtained by numerically integrating eq.(4.21) for
 = 0.1 and ω = 2/
√
3 + k2. Cf. figure 4.4.
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lying in the neighborhood of the unperturbed resonant curve. The unstable n-
cycle appears as n saddles, each carrying a region of localized chaos with it.
Some of these features may be seen in figure 4.6.
4.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we have investigated a simple case of adding periodic coeffi-
cients to a system which is more commonly treated as having constant coeffi-
cients. The system studied is a replicator equation based on an RPS scenario
characterized by the payoff matrix (4.4) and governed by the differential equa-
tions (4.5), (4.6). In the A=0 constant coefficient case, this system is integrable
with the first integral (3.17) and has the property that the equilibrium at
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)
is
Liapunov stable, figure 3.1. By contrast, in the A>0 system with periodic forcing,
this same equilibrium can be unstable, figure 4.2, due to parametric resonance,
figure 4.3. The analysis presented in this paper, valid for small values of A, has
shown that detuning off of this resonance is, however, asymmetric. That is, sys-
tems which lie outside and just to the left of the resonance tongue of figure 4.3
have very different behavior from those systems which lie just to the right of the
same tongue. See figures 4.7, 4.8. This behavior is predicted by the perturbation
theory, cf. the Poincare´ maps in figure 4.4. For larger values of A we have seen
that the system studied exhibits KAM type chaos, figure 4.6.
Our results have implications for biological systems with RPS characteristics,
such as the side-blotched lizard Uta stansburiana that displays persistent oscilla-
tions in population frequencies [18]. Previous work has described the dynamics
of this species using an evolutionary model with damping, and has attributed
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Figure 4.6: Poincare´ map obtained by numerically integrating eq.(4.21) for
 = 1 and ω = 2/
√
3 + k2. Cf. figure 4.5.33
the persistence of the oscillations observed in the data to stochastic perturba-
tions which reset the initial conditions (using a verbal rather than mathematical
argument) [18]. In this work, we have instead approached this issue by consid-
ering an external forcing function that drives the system via periodicity in the
payoff coefficients. We showed how deterministic external forcing can lead to
aperiodic variation in population frequency.
Figure 4.7: Motion of eqs. (4.5), (4.6) for A = 0.1 and ω = 2√
3
− ( 1
3
√
3
+0.2)A =
1.1155 for initial conditions x1 = x2 = 0.3 obtained by numerical
integration. This system lies to the left of the resonance tongue
in figure 4.3. Note that here a motion which starts near the
equilibrium
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)
travels far away from it.
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Figure 4.8: Motion of eqs. (4.5), (4.6) for A = 0.1 and ω = 2√
3
+ ( 1
3
√
3
+
0.2)A = 1.1939 for initial conditions x1 = x2 = 0.3 obtained
by numerical integration. This system lies to the right of the
resonance tongue in figure 4.3. Note that here a motion which
starts near the equilibrium
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)
remains close to it.
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CHAPTER 5
RPS MODEL WITH PERIODIC TIME-VARYING PAYOFFS - THE
GENERAL CASE
We now return to the more general case where our payoff matrix is,

R P S
R 0 −1 + A1 cosωt 1 + A2 cosωt
P 1 + A3 cosωt 0 −1 + A4 cosωt
S −1 + A5 cosωt 1 + A6 cosωt 0
 (5.1)
To help with the analysis, we would like to consider values of Ai under which
the equilibrium at
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)
is preserved under periodic forcing. From eqs. (4.2) and
(4.3), this will require that G1 and G2 vanish at x1 = x2 = 13 . From that condition,
the following relationship arises between the Ai coefficients:
A1 = A6 + A5 − A2 (5.2)
A3 = A6 + A5 − A4 (5.3)
In the previous chapter we showed that for a specific case where A1 = −A2 = A
and A3 = A4 = A5 = A6 = 0 the interior equilibrium point changed stability for
resonant values of the parameters ω and A. Using perturbation theory, we were
able to detect tongues of instability in the parameter space as well as describe
the nonlinear behavior in the different regions of the tongues. In this chapter,
we seek to investigate the existence of such tongues for the more general case.
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5.1 Subharmonic Resonance
We begin by investigating the linear stability of the interior equilibrium point.
Recall that the replicator equations for the general model are
x˙1 = x1(1 − 2x2 − x1) + x1G1 cosωt (5.4)
x˙2 = x2(x2 + 2x1 − 1) + x2G2 cosωt (5.5)
where
G1 = A2(1 − x1 − x2) + x2[A1 − x1(A1 + A3)] + F (5.6)
G2 = A4(1 − x1 − x2) + x1[A3 − x2(A1 + A3)] + F (5.7)
and
F = (x1 + x2 − 1)[x1(A2 + A5) + x2(A4 + A6)] (5.8)
When we apply the conditions in eqs. (5.2) and (5.3), the governing differential
equations become:
x˙1 = x1((A6(x22 − x1x2) + A5(x2(1 − x1) + x21 − x1) + A4(x22 + x2(2x1 − 1))
+A2(x2(2x1 − 2) + x21 − 2x1 + 1)) cosωt − 2x2 − x1 + 1) (5.9)
x˙2 = x2((A6(x22 − (x1 + 1)x2 + x1) + A5(x21 − x1x2) + A4(x22 + (2x1 − 2)x2 + 1 − 2x1)
+A2(2x1x2 + x21 − x1)) cosωt + x2 + 2x1 − 1) (5.10)
First we move the interior equilibrium point to the origin for convenience.
x1 = x +
1
3
, x2 = y +
1
3
(5.11)
Then substitute eqs. (5.11) into (5.9) and (5.10).
x˙ =
1
9
[cosωt{((9x + 3)y2 + (1 − 9x2)y − 3x2 − x)A6
+((−9x2 + 3x + 2)y + 9x3 − 3x2 − 2x)A5
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+((9x + 3)y2 + (18x2 + 9x + 1)y + 6x2 + 2x)A4
+((18x2 − 6x − 4)y + 9x3 − 3x2 − 2x)A2}
+y(−18x − 6) − 9x2 − 3x] (5.12)
y˙ =
1
9
[cosωt{(9y3 + (−9x − 3)y2 + (3x − 2y) + 2x)A6
+((−9x − 3)y2 + (9x2−)y + 3x2 + x)A5
+(9y3 + (18x − 3)y2 + (−6x − 2y) − 4x)A4
+((18x + 6)y2 + (9x2 + 9x + 2)y + 3x2 + x)A2}
+9y2 + y(18x + 3) + 6x] (5.13)
For a linear stability analysis, we linearize (5.12) and (5.13).
x˙ =
((y − x)A6 + (2y − 2x)A5 + (y + 2x)A4 + (−4y − 2x)A2x) cosωt − 6y − 3x
9
(5.14)
y˙ =
((2x − 2y)A6 + (x − y)A5 + (−2y − 4x)A4 + (2y + x)A2) cosωt + 3y + 6x
9
(5.15)
Now we transform this system of first-order ODEs into a second-order ODE for
convenience in eliminating secular terms in the upcoming perturbation method.
We find
f1 x¨ + f2 x˙ + f3x = 0 (5.16)
where
f1 = −9((A6 + 2A5 + A4 − 4A2) cosωt − 6) (5.17)
f2 = 18(A6 + A5) cosωt − 9ω(A6 + 2A5 + A4 − 4A2) sinωt
−3(A6 + A5)(A6 + 2A5 + A4 − 4A2) cos2 ωt (5.18)
f3 = 18 + 3(A6 − 4A5 − 5A4 + 8A2) cosωt − 9ω(A6 + 2A5 − A4) sinωt
+(−A26 + (−A5 + A4 + 8A2)A6 + 2A25 + (11A4 − 8A2)A5 + 2A24 − 16A2A4 + 8A22) cos2 ωt
−(A6 + 2A5 + A4 − 4A2)(A2A6 + A4A5 − A2A4) cos3 ωt (5.19)
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We may now use a perturbation method to determine the stability of the interior
equilibrium, now located at the origin, under the assumption of small forcing
amplitudes. To use the perturbation method we make a change of variables
τ = ωt and denote ′ as a derivative with respect to τ. We also write Ai → Ai. If
we neglect terms of O(2), this gives:
g1x′′ + g2x′ + g3x = O(2) (5.20)
where
g1 = 54ω2 − 9ω2(A6 + 2A5 + A4 − 4A2) cos τ (5.21)
g2 = 18ω(A6 + A5) cos τ − 9ω2(A6 + 2A5 + A4 − 4A2) sin τ (5.22)
g3 = 18 + 3(A6 − 4A5 − 5A4 + 8A2) cos τ − 9ω(A6 + 2A5 − A4) sin τ (5.23)
To begin with, we determine the resonant value of ω at O() by setting
x = x0 + x1 + O(2) (5.24)
Substituting (5.24) into (5.20) and collecting terms gives:
x′′0 +
x0
3ω2
= 0 (5.25)
x′′1 +
x1
3ω2
= H1x′′0 + H2x
′
0 + H3x0 (5.26)
where
H1 =
(A6 + 2 A5 + A4 − 4 A2) cos τ
6
(5.27)
H2 =
ω(A6 + 2 A5 + A4 − 4 A2) sin τ + (−2 A6 − 2 A5) cos τ
6ω
(5.28)
H3 =
ω(3 A6 + 6 A5 − 3 A4) sin τ + (−A6 + 4 A5 + 5 A4 − 8 A2) cos τ
18ω2
(5.29)
From (5.25), we see that x0 will have a solution with frequency 1√3ω whereupon
the right hand side of eq. (5.26) will have terms with frequencies:
1 ± 1√
3ω
(5.30)
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Resonant values of ω will correspond to forcing frequencies (5.30) which are
equal to natural frequencies of the homogeneous x1 equation, i.e. to 1√3ω . This
gives that
ω =
2√
3
(resonance) (5.31)
This value of ω corresponds to the largest resonance tongue. There are an infini-
tude of smaller tongues which would emerge from the perturbation method if
we were to continue it to O(2) and higher. These have been shown [15] to be of
the form ω0 = 2/(n
√
3) for n = 2, 3, ...
In order to investigate the nature of the dynamical behavior in the neighbor-
hood of the resonance (5.31), we define two time scales ξ and η
ξ = τ, η = τ (5.32)
and we consider x to be a function of ξ and η, whereupon the chain rule gives:
x′ = xξ + xη (5.33)
x′′ = xξξ + 2xξη + 2xηη (5.34)
We detune ω off of the resonance (5.31):
ω =
2√
3
+ k1 + · · · (5.35)
and expand x = x0 + x1 + · · ·. Substituting (5.33), (5.34) and these expansions
into (5.20) and collecting terms, we obtain:
x0ξξ +
1
4
x0 = 0 (5.36)
x1ξξ +
1
4
x1 = −2x0ξη + h1x0ξξ + h2x0ξ + h3x0 +
√
3
4
k1x0 (5.37)
where the functions hi in eq.(5.37) are the same as the functions Hi in eq.(5.20)
with τ replaced by ξ and ω replaced by 2√
3
.
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We take the solution of (5.36) in the form:
x0 = a(η) cos
ξ
2
+ b(η) sin
ξ
2
(5.38)
We substitute the expression for x0 (5.38) into the x1 equation (5.37), and remove
secular terms, giving the slow flow:
∂a
∂η
= a
(
A4 − A5
8
√
3
)
+ b
− √34 k1 + A2 − A612 + A4 − A524
 (5.39)
∂b
∂η
= −b
(
A4 − A5
8
√
3
)
+ a
 √34 k1 + A2 − A612 + A4 − A524
 (5.40)
Eqs. (5.39), (5.40) are a constant coefficient linear system with the following
eigenvalues:
± 1
12
√
−27k21 + (A2 − A6)2 + (A4 − A5)2 + (A2 − A6)(A4 − A5) (5.41)
For given parameters A2, A4, A5, A6, the equilibrium point a = b = 0 will be ei-
ther unstable (exponential growth) or stable (quasiperiodic motion) depending
respectively on whether the eigenvalues (5.41) are real or imaginary. The transi-
tion between stable and unstable will correspond to zero eigenvalues, given by
the condition:
27k21 = (A2 − A6)2 + (A4 − A5)2 + (A2 − A6)(A4 − A5) (5.42)
Eq. (5.42) will yield two values of k1, let’s call them k1 = ±Q, which from eq.
(5.35) plot as two straight lines in the ω −  plane, representing the boundaries
of the 2:1 subharmonic resonance tongue, see figure 5.1. Inside this tongue the
equilibrium is unstable due to parametric resonance:
ω =
2√
3
± Q, Q =
√
(A2 − A6)2 + (A4 − A5)2 + (A2 − A6)(A4 − A5)√
27
(5.43)
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Figure 5.1: 2:1 subharmonic resonance tongue, eq.(5.43). The RPS equilib-
rium point at x1 = x2 = 13 is linearly unstable for parameters in-
side the tongue. The presence of nonlinearities detunes the res-
onance and prevents unbounded motions which are predicted
by the linear stability analysis.
5.2 Disappearing Tongue
In the special case that A2 = A6 and A4 = A5, we see from eq. (5.43) that Q = 0
and the tongue has closed up, at least to O(). For these parameter values we
have from eqs. (5.2), (5.3):
A1 = A4 = A5 ≡ α, A2 = A3 = A6 ≡ β (5.44)
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so that the payoff matrix (4.1) becomes:

R P S
R 0 −1 + α cosωt 1 + β cosωt
P 1 + β cosωt 0 −1 + α cosωt
S −1 + α cosωt 1 + β cosωt 0
 (5.45)
where ω = 2/
√
3, and the linearized differential eqs. (5.14), (5.15) become:
x˙ =
(yα − (x + y)β) cosωt − 2y − x
3
(5.46)
y˙ =
(−(x + y)α + xβ) cosωt + y + 2x
3
(5.47)
From Floquet theory [20],[15] we know that on the transition curves which de-
fine the two sides of the tongue, i.e. which separate regions of stability from
regions of instability, there exists a periodic solution having frequency ω/2 (a
“subharmonic”). To prove that the tongue has truly disappeared (rather than
approximately so as in perturbation theory), we must show that there COEXIST
two linearly independent solutions having frequency ω/2. To make this easier
to consider, define a new subharmonic time scale T = (ω/2)t = t/
√
3. Then eqs.
(5.46), (5.47) become:
1√
3
dx
dT
=
(yα − (x + y)β) cos 2T − 2y − x
3
(5.48)
1√
3
dy
dT
=
(−(x + y)α + xβ) cos 2T + y + 2x
3
(5.49)
Here we must show that there exists two linearly independent solutions with
frequency 1 in T . For example, when α=β=0, there are two linearly independent
solutions with frequency 1:
x =
√
3 cosT − sinT, y = 2 sinT (5.50)
and
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x = −2 sinT, y = √3 cosT + sinT (5.51)
That is, we are forcing the system at twice its natural frequency. The idea here is
that there normally exists a solution of frequency 1 on each transition curve. In
order to show that there is no tongue, we have to show that the two transition
curves are coincident. In fact we claim that the two transition curves correspond
to k1 = Q = 0, that is, to a single vertical line in the ω− plane, going through the
point ω = 2/
√
3,  = 0. Eqs. (5.48), (5.49) correspond to such a vertical line, and
so we want to show that there are two linearly independent solutions to these
equations.
Numerical simulations of eqs. (5.48), (5.49) have shown that this result is valid
to all orders of , i.e., eqs. (5.48), (5.49) exhibit a frequency 1 solution for all
nontrivial initial conditions, regardless of the values of α, β or . That is, the
tongue really does close up and the instability disappears. Moreover, numerical
evidence shows that all the other tongues in the  − ω plane (which emanate
from points on the ω-axis at ω = 2/(n
√
3), see [15]) also close up and disappear.
We supplement these numerical results with the following
THEOREM: All nontrivial solutions to eqs. (5.48), (5.49) are periodic with fre-
quency 1.
Proof: We assume a solution to eqs. (5.46), (5.47) in the form (“variation of
parameters”):
x = u(
√
3 cosT − sinT ) + v(−2 sinT ) (5.52)
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y = u(2 sinT ) + v(
√
3 cosT + sinT ) (5.53)
where u and v are functions of T to be found. Note that (u = 1, v = 0) gives (5.50),
while (u = 0, v = 1) gives (5.51). Substituting (5.52), (5.53) into (5.48), (5.49) gives
the following eqs. on u and v:
√
3
du
dT
=  cos 2T (−βu + (α − β)v) (5.54)
√
3
dv
dT
=  cos 2T ((β − α)u − αv) (5.55)
Next we define new time variable z:
dz =
 cos 2T√
3
dT ⇒ z =  sin 2T
2
√
3
(5.56)
which gives the following constant coefficient linear system on u,v:
d
dz
 uv
 =
 −β α − ββ − α −α

 uv
 (5.57)
The matrix in (5.57) has eigenvalues:
λ = −
(
α + β
2
)
± i
√
3
2
(β − α) (5.58)
Thus the general solution to (5.57) involves a linear combination of terms of the
form
exp
(
α + β
2
z
)  sincos

√
3
2
(β − α)z (5.59)
Therefore since z is a pi-periodic function of T , we see that u and v also have pe-
riod pi in time T . Then from (5.52), (5.53), it follows that x and y have period 2pi
in T , since the product of a pi-periodic function and a 2pi-periodic function has
period 2pi. Q.E.D.
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5.3 Conclusion
From a dynamical systems point of view, we may summarize our findings as
follows: The original RPS system, with payoff matrix (3.2) and no forcing, ex-
hibits an equilibrium at
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)
which is stable. With the addition of forcing,
there will generally be a 2:1 subharmonic resonance region in parameter space
in which the equilibrium becomes unstable. In this chapter we have shown that
this tongue may be absent or very small if the forcing parameters are chosen
appropriately.
In the case that the equilibrium is linearly unstable, the presence of nonlin-
earities detunes the resonance (because the frequency of the motion changes as
the amplitude increases) and prevents the unbounded motions which are pre-
dicted by the linear stability analysis. The resulting unstable motion is either
quasiperiodic or chaotic as described in Chapter 4.
From a biological and social point of view, the presence of periodic forcing
in RPS can lead to quasiperiodic or chaotic oscillations, such as those observed
in the range of biological and social applications. Seemingly stochastic fluctua-
tions in strategy frequencies need not necessarily arise from a stochastic process,
as we have shown in earlier work in the previous chapter. Now we see that de-
pending on the choice of forcing parameters, it is possible to reduce or even
eliminate quasiperiodic motion. Thus, if one was designing an organization,
community or political system where stability was desired, this effect could be
achieved by properly tuning the degree of periodic forcing. A similar logic ap-
plies to biological systems. If the forcing coefficients were themselves subject
to natural selection, evolution might favor coefficients that eliminate the tongue
46
and result in stable population frequencies.
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CHAPTER 6
DISAPPERANCE OF RESONACE TONGUES
In the previous chapter, we were able to show that for certain parameters the
largest resonance tongue at ω = 2√
3
completely disappears and there coexists
two linearly independent solutions that are both 2pi periodic. In this chapter
we consider a more general system of ODEs for which the previous system,eqs.
(5.48), (5.49), is a subset of. Here we aim to prove that the resonance tongues
disappear in the general system given certain parameters and that the system in
the previous chapters meets those conditions. We begin by providing a motivat-
ing example that captures the result we obtained in our previous chapter. Here
we use perturbation methods to find approximate solutions which will sug-
gest that for some special parameters there is no region of instability. However,
since these are only approximate solutions we cannot be certain the tongue has
indeed disappeared. The system with periodic coefficients that we encountered
in eqs. (5.48) and (5.49) can be written in the form:
√
3 δ
dx
dt
= (−1 + 2(µ − 1) cos 2t)x + (−2 + (2 + µ) cos 2t)y (6.1)
√
3 δ
dy
dt
= (2 + (1 − 4µ) cos 2t)x + (1 − (1 + 2µ) cos 2t)y (6.2)
where δ, µ and  are parameters. For fixed µ, we picture the δ− plane and desire
to know for which regions all solutions to (6.1) and (6.2) are bounded (in which
case these equations are said to be stable, and for which regions unbounded
solutions exist (unstable). We are interested in the limit in which  → 0 so we
expand δ = 1 + k + O(2). As in the case of Mathieu’s equation [14] [20], there
is, for typical values of µ, a tongue of instability emanating from the point δ = 1,
 = 0 on the δ-axis. This instability is caused by a 2:1 subharmonic resonance.
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This can be seen by noting that for =0, eqs. (6.1) and (6.2) take the form
√
3
d
dt
 xy
 =
 −1 −22 1

 xy
 (6.3)
Eqs. (6.3) have the general solution: xy
 = A

√
3 cos t − sin t
2 sin t
 + B
 −2 sin t√3 cos t + sin t
 (6.4)
where A and B are arbitrary constants. Note that the forcing function in eqs.
(6.1) and (6.2), cos 2t, has twice the frequency of the solution (6.4) of the unforced
system (6.3), which is the source of the 2:1 resonance. We seek an approximate
solution to eqs.(6.1) and (6.2) valid for small  by using the two variable expan-
sion method [14], also known as the method of multiple scales [12]. We replace
the independent variable t by two time variables, ξ = t and η = t, whereupon
eqs. (6.1) and (6.2) become:
√
3 (1 + k + O(2))
(
∂x
∂ξ
+ 
∂x
∂η
)
= (−1 + 2(µ − 1) cos 2ξ)x + (−2 + (2 + µ) cos 2ξ)y(6.5)
√
3 (1 + k + O(2))
(
∂y
∂ξ
+ 
∂y
∂η
)
= (2 + (1 − 4µ) cos 2ξ)x + (1 − (1 + 2µ) cos 2ξ)y(6.6)
Next we expand x = x0 + x1 +O(2) and y = y0 + y1 +O(2) and collect terms,
giving:
√
3
∂x0
∂ξ
= −x0 − 2y0 (6.7)
√
3
∂y0
∂ξ
= 2x0 + y0 (6.8)
√
3
∂x1
∂ξ
= −x1 − 2y1 + 2(µ − 1)x0 cos 2ξ + (2 + µ)y0 cos 2ξ −
√
3k
∂x0
∂ξ
− √3∂x0
∂η
(6.9)
√
3
∂y1
∂ξ
= 2x1 + y1 + (1 − 4µ)x0 cos 2ξ − (1 + 2µ)y0 cos 2ξ −
√
3k
∂y0
∂ξ
− √3∂y0
∂η
(6.10)
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Eqs. (6.7), (6.8) have the solution (cf. eqs. (6.4)): x0y0
 = A(η)

√
3 cos ξ − sin ξ
2 sin ξ
 + B(η)
 −2 sin ξ√3 cos ξ + sin ξ
 (6.11)
Next we substitute eqs. (6.11) into eqs. (6.9), (6.10) and trigonometrically reduce
the resulting equations, which are of the form:
√
3
∂x1
∂ξ
= −x1 − 2y1 + M1 cos ξ + M2 sin ξ + N.R.T. (6.12)
√
3
∂y1
∂ξ
= 2x1 + y1 + M3 cos ξ + M4 sin ξ + N.R.T. (6.13)
where N.R.T. stands for Non-Resonant Terms, and where the coefficients Mi are
known functions of A(η) and B(η), omitted here for brevity. For no secular terms
in x1 and y1, the following relationships must hold:
2M1 + M3 +
√
3M4 = 0 (6.14)
2M2 −
√
3M3 + M4 = 0 (6.15)
Eqs. (6.14), (6.15) give the following slow flow:
2
√
3
dA
dη
= (2k + µ − 1)A + (4k − µ + 1)B (6.16)
2
√
3
dB
dη
= (4k + 2µ − 2)A + (2k + µ − 1)B (6.17)
Eqs. (6.16), (6.17) are a linear constant coefficient system with eigenvalues
λ = ±1
2
√
(µ − 1)2 − 4k2 (6.18)
The transition between stable and unstable corresponds to λ=0:
λ = 0⇒ k = ±1
2
(µ − 1) (6.19)
Since δ = 1+k+O(2), we see that the tongue of instability has boundaries given
by:
δ = 1 ± 1
2
(µ − 1) + O(2) (6.20)
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In particular we see that when µ=1, the tongue closes up to O(2). Numerical
simulations confirm that as µ → 1 the region of instability begins to narrow. In
figure 6.1 we see that the boundaries of the resonance tongues intersect each
other. These intersections increase in frequency as µ → 1 until eventually the
two boundaries become a straight vertical line at δ = 1.
Figure 6.1: The boundaries of the resonance tongue calculated numeri-
cally. Red is when µ = 0.5, black is when µ = 0.7, and blue
is when µ = 0.9. The boundaries of the tongue intersect multi-
ple times and more frequently as µ→ 1.
The question is, is this an approximate result, valid only to some order of ,
or is it exact, valid to all orders of ?
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6.1 A Theorem
In this section we generalize the preceding example by considering a system in
the following form:
dx
dt
= a1(t) x + a2(t) y (6.21)
dy
dt
= a3(t) x + a4(t) y (6.22)
where
ai(t) = Pi +  Qi cos 2t (6.23)
We assume that when =0, the system (6.21), (6.22) has a pair of linearly inde-
pendent solutions of period 2pi (cf. eqs. (6.4)), which we write in the form:
x = A F1(t) + B F2(t) (6.24)
y = A G1(t) + B G2(t) (6.25)
where A and B are arbitrary constants.
The goal is then to find conditions on the coefficients Pi and Qi such that
eqs. (6.21), (6.22) have two linearly independent solutions of period 2pi for all
 >0.The coexistence of these two solutions for all  >0 means that the associ-
ated 2:1 resonance tongue has closed up, both boundaries being coincident. (As
we saw in the foregoing example, in general each boundary of the tongue pos-
sesses a period 2pi solution. If the system (6.21), (6.22) possesses two linearly
independent period 2pi solutions, then both tongue boundaries are coincident,
and the tongue has closed up.)
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When =0, eqs.(6.21),(6.22) become
d
dt
 xy
 =
 P1 P2P3 P4

 xy
 (6.26)
For eqs.(6.26) to exhibit two linearly independent solutions of period 2pi, its
eigenvalues must be ±i. This requires that the trace of the matrix in (6.26) be
zero, and its determinant be unity, giving:
P4 = −P1 (6.27)
P3 =
−1 − P21
P2
(6.28)
Then without loss of generality we may take the two linearly independent pe-
riod 2pi solutions in (6.24), (6.25) to be:
F1(t) = sin t, G1(t) = ν1 sin t + ν2 cos t (6.29)
and
G2(t) = sin t, F2(t) = ν3 sin t + ν4 cos t (6.30)
where the νi coefficients may be found by substituting (6.29), (6.30) into the =0
equations (6.26), giving:
ν1 = −P1P2 (6.31)
ν2 =
1
P2
(6.32)
ν3 = − P1P21 + P21
(6.33)
ν4 = − P21 + P21
(6.34)
Having characterized the solution of eqs.(6.21), (6.22) for =0, we now go after
the solution for  >0.
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We posit a solution for  >0 using variation of parameters (cf.
eqs.(6.24),(6.25)):
x = u(t) F1(t) + v(t) F2(t) (6.35)
y = u(t) G1(t) + v(t) G2(t) (6.36)
where u(t) and v(t) are unknown functions to be found. Substituting (6.35), (6.36)
into (6.21), (6.22), and solving for du/dt and dv/dt, we get
du
dt
=  cos 2t
[
H1 sin2 t + H2 sin t cos t + H3
]
(6.37)
dv
dt
=  cos 2t
[
H4 sin2 t + H5 sin t cos t + H6
]
(6.38)
where Hi = Hi(P1, P2,Qi, u, v) are known functions, too long to list here.
Motivated by a desire to find conditions which guarantee a pair of linearly
independent solutions to eqs. (6.21), (6.22), we set H1 = H2 = H4 = H5 = 0, which
requires
Q2 = − P22P1 (Q4 − Q1) (6.39)
Q3 =
(1 + P21)
2P1P2
(Q4 − Q1) (6.40)
Assuming that conditions (6.39), (6.40) are fulfilled, eqs.(6.37),(6.38) become:
du
dt
=  cos 2t
[
Q4 u − P22P1 (Q4 − Q1) v
]
(6.41)
dv
dt
=  cos 2t
[
1 + P21
2P1P2
(Q4 − Q1) u + Q1 v
]
(6.42)
Next we reparameterize t by using a new time scale τ defined as:
τ =
1
2
sin 2t (6.43)
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which transforms (6.41), (6.42) into a system with constant coefficients:
du
dτ
= 
[
Q4 u − P22P1 (Q4 − Q1) v
]
(6.44)
dv
dτ
= 
[
1 + P21
2P1P2
(Q4 − Q1) u + Q1 v
]
(6.45)
Although the solution of eqs. (6.44), (6.45) depends on the numerical values
of the coefficients P1, P2, Q1, Q4, it will in general consist of sinusoidal and or
exponential functions of τ, and since τ is pi-periodic in t by eq.(6.43), u(t) and v(t),
the solution functions of (6.44), (6.45), will be pi-periodic in t. Furthermore, we
note by eqs. (6.35), (6.36), that x(t) and y(t), the solution functions of eqs. (6.21),
(6.22), are composed of terms which are the product of pi-periodic functions (i.e.
u(t) and v(t)) and 2pi-periodic functions (i.e. Fi(t) and Gi(t)). Now since the prod-
uct of a pi-periodic function and a 2pi-periodic function has period 2pi, we see
that all solutions of eqs. (6.21), (6.22) are 2pi periodic.
We have therefore proved the following
THEOREM: All nontrivial solutions of eqs. (6.21), (6.22) will have period 2pi
if eqs. (6.27), (6.28), (6.39), (6.40) are satisfied.
6.2 Application
In this section we apply the theorem of the previous section to the example
presented earlier in this chapter. Eqs. (6.1), (6.2), when expressed in the form of
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eqs. (6.21), (6.22) yield the following values for the coefficients Pi and Qi:
P1 = − 1√
3
(6.46)
P2 = − 2√
3
(6.47)
P3 =
2√
3
(6.48)
P4 =
1√
3
(6.49)
Q1 =
−2 + 2µ√
3
(6.50)
Q2 =
2 + µ√
3
(6.51)
Q3 =
1 − 4µ√
3
(6.52)
Q4 = −1 + 2µ√
3
(6.53)
Inspection shows that these values for Pi and Qi satisfy eqs .(6.27), (6.28), (6.39),
(6.40) in the case that µ=1. Therefore we may conclude by the foregoing theorem
that the closing of the tongue at µ=1 is an exact result and is valid to all orders
of .
6.3 Conclusion
The perturbation methods used to find approximate solutions to eqs. (6.1), (6.2)
suggest that for the special value of µ = 1 there exists no region of instability.
Meaning that the resonance tongue has disappeared. The results, however, are
only approximate and using this method we cannot account for all of the higher
order terms. Therefore we set out to prove the disappearance of the resonance
tongue in a different manner. We consider a more general class of differential
equations, seen in eqs. (6.21)-(6.25), for which our original problem is an exam-
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ple of. We chose our parameters carefully so that solutions are guaranteed to
be comprised of two bounded and linearly independent functions of period 2pi.
This leads to the choice of parameters found in eqs. (6.27), (6.28), (6.39), (6.40).
We then show that our original problem satisfies those conditions and, hence,
does not exhibit a resonance tongue.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
We began our investigation of the RPS model with time-varying coefficients
by considering a simple case where there were only two parameters, A and ω.
While the standard RPS model is characterized by neutral cycles surrounding
the interior equilibrium point, our model showed quasiperiodic behavior and
evidence of a change in stability in the interior equilibrium point. We then
sought to find for which values of A and ω the interior equilibrium point ex-
hibited linear resonance. Through perturbation analysis we found that there
existed tongues of instability in the parameter space and that inside of these
tongues the interior equilibrium point was unstable. Using a multiple-scale
perturbation method we were able to derive equations for the slow flow of the
system and see the difference in behavior of the model both inside and outside
of the resonant tongue. We found the the tongue was not symmetric, meaning
the behavior to the left of the tongue was qualitatively different then the behav-
ior to the right of the tongue. The results from the slow flow are valid for small
values of A and are supported by numerically generated Poincare´ maps. For
large values of A we see the appearance of chaos which is associated with KAM
theory.
Following the case with only two parameters, we investigated the dynamics
of our time-varying RPS model for all parameter values for which the interior
equilibrium point remained. We found that, in general, our model has a 2:1
subharmonic resonance region in parameter space where the interior equilib-
rium becomes unstable. Using multiple time scales and perturbation methods
we were able to determine to linear order the boundaries in parameter space for
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the instability region. We were surprised to find that there existed values for Ai
in which our linear approximation of the boundary would disappear. Numeri-
cal integration tests also showed that the instability region had closed. In order
to show that the instability region had indeed disappeared and was not sim-
ply too small to find numerically we sought to prove the result analytically. To
prove that the resonant tongue had disappeared for those parameter values we
needed to show that there coexisted two linearly independent solutions having
frequency ω/2. Using variation of parameters, we were able to postulate a form
of the solution to a scaled version of our dynamical system. We proved that the
solution we postulated did in fact solve our differential equations and that it
was composed of two linearly independent terms having frequency ω/2.
Next we expanded our proof of disappearing tongues of instability to apply
to a broader set of differential equations of which our previous system belonged.
Again, using variation of parameters we were able to find conditions on our
proposed solutions for which there existed two linearly independent solutions
that were 2pi periodic.
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